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**Explaining the 2012 Tuareg Rebellion in Mali and Lack Thereof in Niger**

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## Summary


The 2012 secessionist Tuareg rebellion in Mali set forth events that precipitated a coup d'état, Al-Qaeda linked Islamist organisations gaining control of two-thirds of the country, over 400,000 refugees and internally displaced persons, and a subsequent French military intervention. Given these developments, it is clearly crucial to understand what caused the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in the first place. More broadly, what explains the cycle of violence, exemplified by previous rebellions in 1963, 1990, and 2006, that have come to characterize Malian Tuareg's volatile relationship with the central government?

Niger's Tuareg population joined its Malian counterpart in what looked like twin insurgencies in both the 1990s and mid-2000s. Yet, no rebellion broke out 2012, either independently, or as a result of conflict contagion from Mali. What explains the outbreak of a Tuareg secessionist rebellion in Mali, but the lack thereof in Niger?

Drawing on secondary sources and interviews with regional experts, this memo identifies two factors largely capable of explaining both conflict outbreak in Mali and the lack thereof in Niger in 2012:

- The level of Tuareg political grievances, as correlated with the government's implementation of previous peace treaties.
- The government's ability to disarm an re-integrate the 2011 influx of returning Tuareg fighters formerly employed by Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi into society.

In Mali, failure to implement previous peace agreements, especially promises of decentralisation and integration of Tuareg into government and security services resulted in the level of Tuareg political grievances remaining high. Unmet political grievances, in combination with the return of highly trained and heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya, and the government failing to disarm and re-integrate these into society, was the lethal combination that explains the timing of the rebellion in Mali.

Conversely, the lack of revolt in Niger in 2012 can be largely explained by the same two factors. First, the government implementing decentralisation and re-integration policies, measures outlined in the last peace agreement, resulted in Tuareg political grievances being partly met. Second, Niger was better able to disarm and re-integrate Nigerien Tuareg returning from Libya into society.

# 1. Introduction

The 2012 secessionist Tuareg rebellion in Mali set forth events that precipitated a coup d'état, Al-Qaeda linked Islamist organizations gaining control of two-thirds of the country, over 400,000 refugees and internally displaced persons,[1] and a subsequent French military intervention. Given these developments, it is clearly crucial to understand what caused the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in the first place. More broadly, what explains the cycle of violence, exemplified by previous rebellions in 1963, 1990, and 2006, that have come to characterize Malian Tuareg's volatile relationship with the central government? To gain perspective on these questions, however, one is well served by looking at Niger.

Niger's Tuareg population joined its Malian counterpart in what looked like twin insurgencies in both the 1990s and mid-2000s. Yet, no rebellion broke out 2012, either independently, or as a result of conflict contagion from Mali. The lack of a secessionist rebellion is especially puzzling given that the last rebellion in 2009 ended without a formal peace treaty.What explains the outbreak of a Tuareg secessionist rebellion in Mali, but the lack thereof in Niger? This memo seeks to explain this research question from the perspective of the Tuareg.

# 2. Research Method: Comparative Case Studies

The reason why looking at Niger to understand the Malian Tuareg rebellion is important is because if one tries to explain conflict outbreak in Mali by merely studying the events that precipitated the revolt there, it is possible that what one identifies as explanatory factors may in fact be present in other cases where no conflict broke out. To get the greatest possible traction on the research question we need to look at another case that is as similar as possible to Mali, but where no revolt broke out. Niger is such a case. If one identifies explanatory factors for the rebellion present in Mali that were also absent in Niger, and therefore may explain the lack of revolt there, one can have greater confidence in the validity of the conclusion reached here.

# 3. Findings

Drawing on secondary sources and interviews with regional experts, this memo identifies two factors largely capable of explaining both conflict outbreak in Mali and the lack thereof in Niger in 2012:

- The level of Tuareg political grievances, as correlated with the government's implementation of previous peace treaties.
- The government's ability to disarm an re-integrate the 2011 influx of returning Tuareg fighters formerly employed by Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi into society.

In Mali, failure to implement previous peace agreements, especially promises of decentralisation and integration of Tuareg into government and security services resulted in the level of Tuareg political grievances remaining high. Unmet political grievances, in

[1] Lecocq, Baz et al. "One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multivocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided Republic of Mali, "*Review of African Political Economy*," 40:137, 2013, 350.

combination with the return of highly trained and heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya, and the state failing to disarm and re-integrate these into society was the lethal combination that explains the timing of the rebellion in Mali.

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## 4. Who Are the Tuareg?

The Tuareg are a traditionally nomadic people of Berber heritage[2] located primarily in the regions of the Sahara spanning Mali, Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya.[3] Tuareg are generally Sunni Muslims of Sufist orientation,[4] which speak Tamasheq.[5] Organised in clans, they adhere to a highly hierarchical caste system.[6] The largest concentration of Tuareg can be found in Mali and Niger,[7] where they represent approximately 10% of the population, respectively.[8]

## 5. Previous Tuareg Rebellions in Mali and Niger

### 5.1 Mali 1963

The first Malian Tuareg rebellion followed upon decolonisation, in 1963. The movement protested Tuareg marginalisation in society and the lack of development aid, despite having to pay taxes.[9] The Malian government reacted to the rebellion with severe force, targeting the Tuareg population as a whole, by for example killing herds and poisoning wells.[10] The army swiftly and brutally crushed the rebellion, and the area inhabited by the Tuareg was placed under military administration. Interestingly, there was no Tuareg revolt in Niger immediately following decolonisation, potentially because the first postcolonial government had some Tuareg representation. [11]

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[2] Minorities at Risk Project, College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201

[3] Tham Lindell, Magdalena, and Kim Mattson, "Transnational Threats to Peace and Security in the Sahel: Consequences in Mali," FOI-R- 3881-SE, June 2014, 15.

[4] Asfura-Heim, Patricio, "The Tuareg: A Nation Without Borders?, A CNA [Center of Naval Analyses] Strategic Studies Conference Report, May 2013, 5

[5] Tham Lindell and Mattson, 15.

[6] Keita, Kalifa, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali," Strategic Studies Institute, May 1998, 6, 7.

[7] Tham Lindell and Mattson, 15.

[8] CIA World Factbook; Asfura-Heim, 3.

[9] Benjaminsen, Tor A.,"Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violent Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali, *Journal of Peace Research*, 2008:45, 828.

[10] International Crisis Group, "Mali: Avoiding Escalation," Africa Report no. 189, 18 July 2012, 2.

[11] International Crisis Group,"Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?," September 2013,4

## 5.2 Mali 1990, Niger 1991

The northern regions of Mali and Niger suffered severe droughts between 1968 and 1974, and again in 1980 and 1985, hitting the Tuareg nomad population hard.[12] None of the governments allocated funds to relieve the suffering of the Tuareg, despite receiving international humanitarian aid for that very purpose.[13] With their herds dying, a majority of Tuareg were deprived of their livelihood, resulting in many fleeing to Algeria and Libya. In Libya, many Tuareg males enrolled as fighters in Ghaddafi's army, thus gaining significant combat experience.[14] While in Libya, the diaspora initiated planning for rebellion upon the eventual return to their homelands.[15]

In 1987, the Nigerien government announced a public resettlement program, promising assistance to those having repatriated to neighboring countries.[16] The oil crisis of 1985 and the dissolution of Ghaddafi's Islamic Legion[17] in 1989 meant numerous Tuareg were laid off in Algeria and Libya, causing many to seize the opportunity to return home.[18] Yet, upon their arrival they found that there were no resettlement funds available.[19] A subsequent demonstration protesting this in Tchin Tabaraden, Niger, in 1990, resulted in a security guard getting killed, an event that set off a government military response that left hundreds of civilian Tuareg dead in its wake.[20] The massacre was the spark that ignited Tuareg rebellions across both Mali and Niger.

The massacre caused many Nigerien Tuareg to flee to Mali, where some were arrested. This precipitated a prison break-out to liberate the captives by a newly formed rebel group,[21] the Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad (MPLA).The Malian government declared a state of emergency in the north[22] and implemented the same harsh counterinsurgency strategy it employed in the previous rebellion.[23] Heavy fighting ensued. With Algerian mediation, a preliminary peace accord was reached in Tamanrasset in January 1991.[24] Yet, the fall of President Moussa Traoré resulted in the rebellion continuing, and it was not until April 1992 that the united coalition of rebel groups, the Mouvement et fronts unifiés de l'Azawad (MFUA), and the government agreed to cease hostilities through the signing of the *National Pact.*[25] The agreement called for the integration of rebels into the armed forces, the creation of mixed brigades for the country's northern region, and decentralisation measures that would

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[12] Keita,12
[13] Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201.
[14] Keita 13; Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201.

[15] Benjaminsen, 829; International Crisis Group 2013, 9; Guichaoua, Yvan, "Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009)," MICROCON Research Working Paper 20, December 2009, 11.
[16] International Crisis Group 2013,10.
[17] The Islamic Legion was a military force created by Qaddafi for the purposes of his Pan-African project and as a counterweight against Western military presence in the region.
[18] Keita, 13.

[19] Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201; Guichaoua, 10.

[20] Minorities at Risk Project; Krings, Thomas, "Marginalisation and Revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger," *GeoJournal,* May 1995, 36.1, 60.
[21] Krings, 60-
[22] Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201.

[23] Lebovich and Thurston, 22.
[24] Keita, 16.
[25] Krings, 61.

give partial autonomy to the north.[26] It was nevertheless not until March 1996 that all armed factions, including anti-Tuareg militias, finally lay down their arms by burning them in the symbolic *Flamme de la Paix* ceremony.[27]

In Niger, returning Tuareg fighters and outrage at the Tchin Tabaraden massacre resulted in clashes with security forces. Yet, full-blown rebellion, initially under the leadership of the Front de la libération de l'Air et Azawad (FLAA), did not break out until 1991, when soldiers responsible for the massacre were freed of charges and reinstated into their old positions in the security forces.[28]

The Nigerien government was initially adamant about its unwillingness to grant even partial independence to the Tuareg, due to the area this people call their homeland holding one of the biggest uranium mines in Africa, from which much of the country´s wealth comes.[29] Unwilling to give up this natural resource rich territory, the government adopted an 'iron-hand' policy of counterinsurgency, which entaied indiscriminate targeting of civilians.[30]

Negotiations between the four Tuareg factions[31] now unified under the name Coordination de la résistance armée (CRA) and the government did not start until the election of Mahamane Ousmane in 1993. They resulted in the 1995 *Ouagadougou Agreement*, later complemented by the 1997 *Algiers* and 1998 *N'Djamena Accords*. The treaties included more or less the same main provisions as the Malian peace agreement: Reintegration of rebels into the security forces and decentralisation meant to provide partial political autonomy.[32]

## 5.3 Mali 2006, Niger 2007

Failure to implement the peace agreements struck in the 1990s resulted in another round of fighting in Mali in 2006 and Niger in 2007.[33] Whereas the Malian government and the main rebel group, the Alliance démocratique pour le changement (ADC) were quick to find a negotiated settlement ending the fighting through the signing of the *Algiers Accord* in 2006,[34] armed conflict was harder to stem in Niger. This was despite the fact that the revolt was not widely supported by the civilian population, which was still war weary from the rebellion of the 1990s.[35]

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[26] Krings, 61;Keita 17; Seely, Jennifer C, "A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39:3, 2001, 507.

[27] Lebovich and Thurston, 24.

[28] Krings, 62.

[29] Krings,62.

[30] Westerfield, Brian S., "Decentralization, Counterinsurgency and Conflict Recurrence: A Study of the Tuareg Uprisings in Mali and Niger," Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2012, 27.

[31] FLAA, the Front de la libération tamoust (FLT), the Armée révolutionaire de la libération du nord Niger (ARLNN), and the Front patriotique de libération du Sahara (FPLS).

[32] Minorities at Risk Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=43201; International Crisis Group 2013, 10; Guichaoua, 11.

[33] International Crisis Group 2013, 11; Westerfield, 3; Asfura-Heim, 5.

[34] International Peace Institute, "Mali and the Sahel- Sahara: From Crisis Management to Sustainable Strategy," February 2013, 4.

[35] International Crisis Group 2013, 27

In Mali, the *Algiers Accord* repeated the provisions set out in the *National Pact*, with a special emphasis on the creation of local security forces for the north and continued decentralisation.[36] In Niger, heavy fighting and substantial losses on both sides, but especially on that of the rebels,[37] resulted in a Libya mediated ceasefire in April 2009 between the Mouvement des nigériens pour la justice (MNJ), and the remaining faction Malian rebels still fighting following the *Algiers Accord*, the Alliance touareg Niger-Mali (ATNM) led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga. Although no formal peace agreement was signed, the two rebel groups agreed to disarm,[38] enticed by the promise of Libyan economic compensation for doing so.[39] Following the ceasefire, Bahanga took up residence in Libya.

# 6. Why a 2012 Tuareg Rebellion in Mali, But None in Niger?

## 6.1 Mali 2012

August 2011 saw the return to Mali of hundreds[40] of heavily armed Tuareg fighters who had deserted Ghaddafi's defeated army following the NATO intervention in Libya.[41] Whether due to lacking political will, reach, or inefficient use of available resources provided by France, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU) to ensure security in the north,[42] the Malian government largely failed to disarm or reintegrate these fighters into society upon their arrival.[43] The sudden influx of fighters and armament changed the calculus among important strata of Malian Tuareg,[44] many who still had serious political grievances vis-a-vis the state due to the latter's failure to implement previous peace agreements.[45] Not only had the decentralisation efforts outlined in the *National Pact* stalled,[46] but perhaps more importantly, promises to create local security forces primarily represented by northern recruits had been largely abandoned.[47] On top of this, the Malian development program for the north, the EU financed Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement au nord-

[36] Wing, Susanna D., "Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 331, May 2013, 6.
[37] International Crisis Group 2013, 12.

[38] Emerson, Stephen A., "Desert Insurgency: Lessons from the Third Tuareg Rebellion," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 22:4, 2011, 677.

[39] International Crisis Group 2013, 12.

[40] There are no exact figures and press accounts makes references to" hundreds"( Nossiter, Adam, "Qaddafi's Weapons, Taken by Old Allies, Reinvigorate an Insurgent Army in Mali,"*New York Times,* February 5, 2012; Cavendish, Julius, "Nomadic rebels Now Armed to the Teeth After Fall of Gaddafi," *The Times,* March 23, 2012; as well as "thousands" (Stewart, Scott, "Stratfor: Mali besieged by fighters fleeing Libya," *Stratfor*, February 3, 2012) of Malian Tuareg ex-fighters returning from Libya.

[41] Stewart.

[42] International Crisis Group 2012, 5; Wing 7.
[43] Interview with regional expert, October 15, 2014. Doing so was also made harder due to the fact that rebels had hid their weapons in the desert upon arrival (International Crisis Group 2012, 10).
[44] Asfura-Heim, 6

[45] Wing, 4; International Peace Institute, 4; IRIN, "Can Niger Offer Mali Lessons on the Tuareg?," April 11, 2013; International Crisis Group 2012, 8.

[46] It appears as if the implementation phase of the *National Pact* stalled almost directly following the agreement due to political instability in the country (Wing, 4)
[47] Wing, 6.

Mali (PSPSDN), launched in August 2011,[48] caused much resistance because it emphasized security over development, resulting in an increased northern presence of the, by Tuareg, much reviled national security forces.[49] The International Crisis Group argues that the Malian government used the program primarily to control the Tuareg militarily, rather than, as envisioned by its donors, employ it as a means to implement the peace treaty.[50]

An influx of military resources combined with political grievances resulted in Tuareg locals, army deserters, but especially ex-Libyan fighters creating the Mouvement national de l'Azawad (MNLA), with the goal of achieving independence, in October 2011.[51] Mobilization of returning Tuareg ex-soldiers from Libya was made easier because MNLA leader Ag Mohamed Najem was a former Libyan Army colonel,[52] in addition to being the cousin of the previous rebel leader Bahanga. The latter had organised Malian Tuareg militarily prior to the return from Libya of Tuareg ex-soldiers, including Najem[53]

The Malian army was ultimately no match for the MNLA, armed with heavy weaponry from the former Libyan army. [54] A cohort in the military, distraught by the government's inability to assist it in countering the MNLA,[55] deposed President Touré on 22 March 2012.[56] The implosion of the state, which resulted in the Malian army retreating,[57] provided MNLA with the momentum needed to push further, successfully capturing Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, and, having achieved its objective, declaring the independence of Azawad, an area consisting of two-thirds of the country, on 6 April 2012.[58]

However, military fatigue[59] and failure to implement order in cities where Tuareg are not a majority, such as Timbuktu,[60] caused the MNLA to lose territorial control to the well-armed Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamist organisations Ansar Dine, Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'ouest, (MUJAO) and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). In response, and acting on the request of the Malian government, the French government launched *Operation Serval* on January 11, 2013, with the objective of reclaiming territory lost to rebel forces back to the national government.

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[48] International Crisis Group 2012, 6.

[49] Wing 7; IRIN 2013.

[50] International Crisis Group 2012, 7.The ICG actually puts the matter much more bluntly, claiming that the Malian "government seemed to have used [PSPSDN] to discard previous accords and replace them with a sham attempt to address the new security threats" (7).

[51] Lebovich and Thurston, 28.

[52] Stewart.

[53] International Crisis Group 2012, 11.

[54] Nossiter.

[55] Wing, 6.

[56] IRIN,"Mali: A Timeline of Northern Conflict," April 5, 2012.

[57] Interview with regional expert, October 15, 2014.

[58] Lebovich and Thurston 29; International Crisis Group 2012, 13.

[59] International Crisis Group 2012, 16-17.

[60] Interview with regional expert, September 29, 2014.

## 6.2 Why No 2012 Rebellion in Niger?

Given previous twin Tuareg rebellions in both countries in the 1990s and mid-2000s, why did we only see a Tuareg revolt in Mali but not in Niger in 2012? The two factors causing the Malian rebellion – political grievances remaining high due to the government's failure to uphold previous peace agreements, and the arrival of heavily armed Tuareg fighters from Libya – also largely explain the lack of a Nigerien uprising, either independently, or as a result of conflict contagion.

Despite no actual peace agreement being reached following the 2007 Nigerien rebellion, and that rebels promised compensation from Ghaddafi in 2009 for disarming were never compensated for doing so,[61] the Issofou government in Niger has implemented some of the provisions of the peace accord that ended fighting in the 1990s,[62] which called for greater decentralisation, ex-rebels being integrated into society, and Tuareg being granted proceeds from uranium mining.[63]

The ultimate example of Tuareg integration into Malian politics is perhaps the appointment of Brig Rafini as prime minister in April 2011.[64] In terms of decentralisation, the northern region have been divided up into largely self-governing municipalities led by local representatives, three quarters of which are Tuareg.[65] Consequently, political grievances among Tuareg in Niger have been partly met,[66] something that may have prevented the Malian rebellion from spreading across the border.

Although there is no exact information on the number of Tuareg ex-fighters returning to Niger from Libya,[67] the Nigerien government appears to have been better adept at dealing with those who did arrive than was Mali, efficiently disarming and reintegrating them into society.[68] For example, the Nigerien government has enacted a "veteran reinsertion and reintegration policy" that has provided former Tuareg rebels with jobs in both the private and public sector.[69]

The effort of the Nigerien government to ensure security in the north is driven by the fact that it stands to lose more by instability in the region than may have been the case in Mali, since the uranium mines so important to the national economy are located in the contested territory. The importance of this commodity, in combination with French and Chinese commercial

[61] Interview with regional expert, September 29, 2014.
[62] IRIN 2013.

[63] Reuters, "Tuareg Uprisings in Mali Threatens Neighbour Niger," May 3, 2012; IRIN 2013; ECOWAS, Under Attack? "Niger Faced with Religious Extremism and Terrorism," *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report,* Issue 7, September 2013, 3; Jakobsson, Oskar and Mikael Eriksson, "Sahel- En Säkerhetspolitisk Mosaik," FOI-R-3446—SE; 2012, 37; Hicks, Celeste, "Tuareg Rebels Make Troubled Return from Libya to Mali" *BBC News*, 29 February, 2012; Larémont, Ricardo René, After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger and Algeria*, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,* 2:29, 3; Interview with regional experts, September 29 and October 9, 2014.
[64] International Crisis Group,"Niger: Another Weak Link in the Sahel?," September 2013, 28.
[65] ECOWAS, 3.
[66] Larémont, 3.
[67] Interview with regional expert, October 15, 2014; Email conversation with regional experts on October 9 and 13, 2014.
[68] Jakobsson and Eriksson, 36; ECOWAS, 3, IRIN 2013; Email conversation with regional expert, October 13, 2014.

[69] ECOWAS, 3.

interests associated with it means that Niger is well motivated to ensure that the situation in the north remains stable.[70]

Finally, two factors made it likely that Tuareg ex-rebels arriving in Niger from Libya with secessionist aspirations had little hope of succeeding. First, the importance of uranium mines to the French made it likely that any occupation of the north would cause the latter to intervene.[71] Second, the previous rebellion had been crushed to such an extent that the Tuareg community had little desire for another one.[72] Indeed, it appears as if the government was confident of no revolt breaking out, since it does not appear to have hesitated to contribute peacekeeping forces to ECOWAS´ Mali mission,[73] AFISMA,[74] something that could otherwise potentially have riled up Nigerien Tuareg out of solidarity for their Malian brethren.

## 7. Conclusion and Policy Implications

What policy implications can be derived from concluding what the reasons for a Tuareg rebellion breaking out in Mali but not in Niger, in 2012 were?

The root causes of the Tuareg conflict in Mali lay in the unmet promises of decentralisation and reintegration, as stated in the 2006 *Algiers Accord*. Although Niger by no means has fulfilled the provisions of the latest peace accord completely, it has done so to a degree where Nigerien Tuareg feel their grievances have been partly met, thus making the desire to rebel lower.

Yet, it was the influx of Tuareg ex-fighters returning from Libya that made the rebellion in Mali possible. What could have prevented this from happening? It is possible that had the international community been better at foreseeing the repercussions of Tuareg ex-fighters arriving from Libya to Mali following the fall of Ghaddafi, it would have been able to boost the government´s ability to disarm and integrate these men into society upon their return, something that would have prevented them from forming and joining the MNLA.

Yet, with funding from the EU through the PSPSDN, Mali's government actually *had* the financial resources needed to initiate a better functioning decentralisation and reintegration program, such as that of Niger, which could potentially have averted the outbreak of rebellion. The failure to deal with the Libyan ex-soldiers as efficiently as Niger appears to have been largely due to lack of political will on the behalf of the Malian government, but perhaps also because of lack of state legitimacy or political reach in the region as a result of previous rebellions. These latter factors do not, however, seem to have prevented Niger's government from implementing a better functioning program.

Given the Malian government's lacking political will, the EU, as a key donor to the PSPSDN program could have taken a more active role in ensuring that program funds were targeted towards implementing previous peace accords, as was indeed part of the program's political

[70] Email conversation with regional expert, October 13, 2014; International Crisis Group 2012.
[71] Interview with regional expert, October 13, 2014.

[72] International Crisis Group 2013, 12; Email conversation with regional expert October 9, 2014.
[73] International Crisis Group 2013, 38.
[74] African-led International Support Mission to Mali.

rationale. Instead, the program came to emphasise security over decentralisation and development of the north.

Considering the conclusion of this analysis, the importance of making sure that future peace agreements with the Tuareg in Mali are implemented on the ground is clear: Doing so effectively may increase the chances of preventing yet another rebellion. The EU may hence be in a unique position to ameliorate future conflict involving the Tuareg in Mali.

Likewise, the international community would be well served to monitor the Nigerien situation to ensure that decentralisation efforts outlined in previous peace agreements continue being implemented. In both cases, increasing the odds that these governments do not renege on their commitments as outlined in previous or future peace treaties can be made more likely by making the disbursement of funds dependent on such compliance.

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